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The paper: 
 
The Queensland Premier - Rt Hon Joh Bjelke Petersen - revealed a cabinet decision 
on the 5th September 1977, which banned certain political street marches.  The 
decision had police support.  Nine days later, an amendment to ‘Section 57A’ of The 
Traffic Act was rushed through Parliament.  The police were now sole arbitrators of 
march permits, unless the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court.  Such appeals 
were impractical and, in effect, the Commissioner's interpretation of the amendment 
meant a selective ban on street marches.  
  
The march issue was not only about the presence or absence of street protesters.  It 
also questioned the role of police within society.  The inferences were that the Police 
Commissioner was prejudging some applicants as violent - to justify the ban - and that 
the law's application was unequal.  The Commissioner's political impartiality was 
dubious, and it appeared that he was willing to interpret and enforce sectional 
legislation, if it achieved an appropriate political goal.  This theme fused together the 
conflicting philosophies and personalities of an extra-parliamentary left. An 
amorphous but pragmatic protest movement emerged, and it demanded reform.  
Activists, by withdrawing their obedience and by accepting government sanctions, 
guaranteed that the abstract moral overtones of the issue became a political reality. 
 
The first major confrontation continued throughout a Saturday afternoon on Brisbane 
streets. The aggressive police action produced 418 arrests. Subsequently, a series of 
confrontations characterised the movement.  It was nonviolent, negative mode and 
used tactical method.  The massing of people, the linking of arms, the chanting of 
slogans, the wearing of symbols, the abuse of police, and the monotonous marching at 
police lines, together put the issue in a confrontation context.  The government 
capitalised on this and continued a policy of social ostracism against the movement.  
This was effective, because the parliamentary ALP dumped the marchers. Its leader, 
Tom Burns, refused to attend one rally and urged protesters not to march at a 
subsequent one.  No state Labor parliamentarian ever marched. The final 
embarrassment came when the ALP foolishly applied for a permit, and the 
Commissioner granted it.  Party stalwarts then refused to march, fearing violence, and 
this damaged the movement’s credibility.  The Queensland branch of the ALP was 
impotent, pathetically divided, and devoid of fortitude and personality. Hundreds of 
arrests polarised metropolitan Queensland, and the inadequacies of the democratic 
process were exposed.  Even in this environment, it is significant that the ALP could 
not establish itself as a viable alternative. 
 
The Liberal Party was also embarrassed.  Liberal ministers had initiated and 
supported the ban, but could not reverse it. The organisational and parliamentary 
wings had differing policies and tension grew within the party.  Knox (now Sir 
William), and later, Edwards, straddled their factions with a series of ambiguous 
statements. However, the Liberal organisation was eventually prepared to take a stand 
on the march issue.  The weapon was a separate Senate ticket. This was one potential 
weakness in the Nationals' power base. 
 
Civil liberties were not an issue in rural areas, and the Nationals were publicly united 
against the marchers. Big business and farming interests demanded a monolithic 
Petersen to preserve 'free enterprise democracy'.  He responded with a series of 
intolerant statements, which inflamed the confrontations.  Petersen was seen as a 
strong Christian leader who was resisting a violent communist plot to overthrow 
normal parliamentary processes.  
 
The movement's tactics slowly eroded Petersen's support.  Watch houses were 
overcrowded with protesters, courts were clogged with cases, and police manpower 
was strained.  The media questioned the costing of the legislation.  The government 
was reluctant to reveal this information.  
  
In April, 1978, the law was ridiculed by a series of ingenious protests, and a Supreme 
Court challenge was being organised. The movement now introduced a new tactic. It 
refused to march.  This refuted Petersen's ‘violence argument’, and wasted police 
resources, with no expense incurred to the protesters. By mid 1978, the movement had 
gained moral support from the media, the institutionalised churches, the unions, and 
many community leaders.  The police compromised and applied the ban only to 
Brisbane.  
 
This did not placate the Liberal organisation or the marchers.  Major confrontations 
and mass arrests continued. In December The Trades and Labour Council - with a 
membership of 350,000 - issued a challenge.  The police always allowed the 
traditional Labor Day marches but, for this occasion the TLC refused to apply for a 
permit. Government support was fragmenting, and Petersen launched a multi-media 
campaign to defend the policy.  His Minister for Police offered a permit (for a 
Saturday) to the TLC, and this was a major breakthrough.  However to express 
solidarity with minority groups, the TLC refused the offer. The result was 337 arrests.  
The waterfront and mining unions retaliated with powerful strikes.  The mining and 
shipping industries were suffering heavy losses, and they paid unionists fines to 
minimise work stoppages. Government sanctions had broken down, and police action 
was almost ineffective. 
  
The ban was a police blunder.  They had publicly supported the policy, refused to see 
delegations, and refused to explain the reasons for refusal.  As they lost popular 
support, they used a policy of selective arrest to portray the demonstrators as 'hard 
core professionals'. A magistrate had questioned police integrity over the Queen's 
Park arrests, and budget deficits were reaching alarming proportions. There was not 
sufficient manpower to adequately enforce the legislation and the police were 
developing a public image problem. 
   
The final irony was to come.  In front of the television cameras, a young constable 
rebelled against his superiors.  Public opinion was so antagonistic to the Department, 
that his rebellion was treated as a resignation and his superiors refused to discipline 
him.  The movement had shattered the morale of the police, and the Department was 
probably responsible for softening Petersen's attitude to the protesters.  To their credit, 
rank-and-file police did not want to be pawns in power politics, and this, together with 
media scrutiny, probably saved the movement from neo-fascist repression.  
 
 In August, 1979, a Brisbane permit was issued. No longer was there a common 
denominator to unite the movement and, it splintered with bitter rivalries surfacing. 
The media turned against the protesters, and commended the government and police 
for allowing protesters to return to the streets at restricted times. At present, an uneasy 
truce exists.  The police have extended conciliatory gestures to some minority groups, 
and they have been reciprocated.  Neither side will forget the confrontations and, 
although the issue is dormant, it is not dead. The movement disappeared, as quickly as 
it had been formed.  Many protesters were prepared to accept the compromise and 
regard it as a tangible success.  Others wanted reform and, in this context, they failed. 
 
